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7
Private Student Loans 
and Bankruptcy 
Did Four-Year Undergraduates Benefi t from the 
Increased Collectability of Student Loans?
Xiaoling Ang
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Dalié Jiménez
University of Connecticut School of Law
What effect will a law that virtually eliminates the possibility that 
a loan will be discharged in bankruptcy have on the pricing and avail-
ability of that loan? This chapter seeks to answer that question by inves-
tigating the effect of bankruptcy discharge on private student loans 
(PSLs). We use a unique data set and fi nd some unexpected results.
On April 20, 2005, President Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) into law.1 The bill 
was the result of intense political wrangling dating as far back as 1999. 2 
Proponents of the bill argued that the signifi cant increases in bank-
ruptcy fi ling rates were the result of strategic debtors taking advantage 
of lax bankruptcy rules; a problem that they thought would be solved 
by increasing the hurdles to a bankruptcy discharge. 3 Opponents argued 
that the vast majority of debtors fi led bankruptcy for reasons largely 
beyond their control: loss of a job, divorce, medical issues, or a death in 
the family. Many argued that instead of further limiting bankruptcy pro-
tection, Congress should focus on regulating the availability of credit.
Proponents of bankruptcy reform predicted that its effect would be 
to reduce the cost of consumer credit by reducing the “bankruptcy tax” 
implicitly spread to all consumers in their cost of credit. Opponents of 
the bill hypothesized that consumer lenders were providing a rebate of 
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the bankruptcy tax to high credit-scoring borrowers, and thus expected 
no change in the cost of student loans as a result of BAPCPA.4 In this 
chapter, we report on our tests of some of the predictions made by both 
groups as they relate to the market and pricing of private student loans.
The 2005 amendments added private student loans (PSLs), that is, 
loans originated by the private market and not insured by any federal 
or state institution, to the list of debts presumptively nondischargeable 
in bankruptcy. Through a series of legislative changes that began in 
1976 and culminated in 1998, loans made, guaranteed, or insured by the 
federal or state governments, as well as loans made by nonprofi t institu-
tions, were already presumptively nondischargeable before 2005.5 
This special treatment granted to PSLs ran counter to two of the 
fundamental policies behind the bankruptcy laws: the equality of treat-
ment of creditors in bankruptcy and the fresh start for the debtor. 6 
Neither of these policies has ever been absolute—tax debts and debts 
obtained by fraud, for example, have both received priority over other 
unsecured creditors and been nondischargeable as far back as the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898.7 Nonetheless, most of the 19 so-called “rifl e-shot” 
exceptions to discharge exist for strong policy reasons. For example, 
when domestic support obligations were added to the list of exceptions, 
the rationale was that this would “provide new protections for parents” 
and “strengthen their ability to collect child support.”8 The rationale for 
adding federal and state loans to the list of presumptively nondischarge-
able debts was to protect the public fi sc.
PSLs are very different from the other kinds of student loans that 
were nondischargeable before the 2005 bankruptcy reform. A brief syn-
opsis of their features is instructive because it highlights how extraor-
dinary the law change was. Unlike federal student loans, PSLs are risk-
priced at origination. Only creditworthy individuals (or individuals with 
creditworthy borrowers) are eligible to obtain PSLs.9 Since the majority 
of undergraduate students do not have a signifi cant credit history, most 
PSLs require students to secure a cosigner who will be responsible for 
the loan if the student does not repay. In fact, 90 percent of all PSLs 
required a cosigner in 2011, even if the student had a good credit history 
or was attending graduate school.10 The cosigner is liable for the loan as 
much as the student is, even if the student does not fi nish school or dies.
PSL borrowers take on the risk of interest rate changes over the 
typical 15–20 year repayment period. The typical PSL is a variable-rate 
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loan, indexed to LIBOR or similar.11 Students are offered loans at an 
“index-plus” variable interest rate. That “plus” (the interest rate charged 
above the index) is the risk premium, presumed to be closely related to 
the risk-of-loss that the lender places on that borrower. In this chapter, 
we refer to that plus as the “margin.” All things being equal, a borrower 
with a higher credit score should receive a loan with a smaller mar-
gin than a borrower with a lower credit score. In 2011, initial variable 
PSL interest rates varied between 2.98 percent and 19 percent for the 
riskiest borrowers.12 Finally, funding for PSLs during the period of our 
study came primarily from the secondary market through asset backed 
securities.13 
When BAPCPA became effective on October 17, 2005, every out-
standing PSL—no matter when originated—became presumptively 
nondischargeable for both borrowers and coborrowers. Loans that were 
originated before BAPCPA presumably priced in the cost of bankruptcy 
dischargeability in their margins (risk premiums), but those loans 
became presumptively nondischargeable all the same.14 
The nondischargeability of PSLs is problematic from at least two 
perspectives: the concern that billions in outstanding student loans may 
be stifl ing the economy and the general lack of protections offered to 
delinquent borrowers.
Standing at over $1 trillion, student loan debt is the second larg-
est type of debt Americans carry, surpassed only by mortgage debt. In 
recent years, regulators, policymakers, and academics have worried 
publicly over the effect this amount of debt has on our economy. PSLs 
are a small but signifi cant feature of the American postsecondary edu-
cation fi nance system and may become more prominent to the extent 
that other forms of aid do not keep pace with increasing costs of atten-
dance. As of 2011, 15 percent of student loan debt had been originated 
by for-profi t companies (typically, but not exclusively, banks) in the 
form of PSLs.15 The current $150 billion in PSL outstandings is espe-
cially concerning because of the lack of protections for borrowers who 
cannot repay. 
Outside of bankruptcy, federal student loans have protections for 
borrowers in fi nancial distress. These include the ability for borrowers 
to enter into income-based or income-contingent repayment plans, tem-
porarily suspend payments for up to 2 years, and extend the term of the 
loan for up to 30 years.16 Federal loans are also eligible for cancellation 
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in the case of total or permanent disability, the death of a student or par-
ent taking out a PLUS Loan, where the school that the student attends 
closes while the student is enrolled, or in some cases, if the student 
becomes a teacher or works in public service.17 None of these features 
are found in the typical PSL. Student borrowers with federal and private 
loans will have a diffi cult time discharging either federal loans or PSLs, 
but they will have a much tougher time living with delinquent private 
loans because of the lack of protections for those in default. In addition, 
some students may have a disproportionate amount of PSL debt relative 
to federal loans because students need not exhaust their federal loan 
opportunities before obtaining a PSL. The CFPB found that “more than 
54 percent of PSL borrowers do not exhaust their Stafford Loan eligibil-
ity, or do not even apply for federal aid.”18
We would ideally like to be able to compare federal and PSL default 
rates and bankruptcy fi ling rates. Unfortunately, it is impossible to com-
pare the default rate of federal loans versus PSLs, owing to differences 
in the methodology of calculating those rates and the lack of availabil-
ity of data. The Department of Education (DOE) does not report how 
many individuals with federal student loans have fi led for bankruptcy. 
The DOE publishes “cumulative lifetime default rates” for loans that 
enter repayment during a fi scal year and have defaulted through the end 
of the fi scal year. As an example, for the cohort that graduated or left 
school in 2006 that had federal student loans, the DOE estimates that 
9.2 percent will default over their lifetime.19 In contrast, what we know 
about PSL default rates is limited to the origination-year level (also 
called “vintages”) or alternatively to loans outstanding at the end of a 
year. The CFPB found that lenders’ underwriting practices had a sig-
nifi cant effect on PSL default rates. While some securitized trusts have 
“default rates expected to reach 50 percent,” some depository institu-
tions that never securitized their loans have default rates of less than 4 
percent.20 The nine lenders in our study had approximately $8.1 billion 
in cumulative defaults as of 2011, a fi gure made up of approximately 
850,000 distinct loans.21 Between 2005 and 2011, as few as 0.2 percent 
of outstanding PSLs and as high as 1.1 percent of all outstanding loans 
made by the lenders in our study were included in a bankruptcy fi ling.22
This chapter relies on a unique large data set that sheds some light 
on the typically opaque private student loan market. Per a congressio-
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nal mandate, the CFPB collected data that have never been available 
before.23 Our data set covers loan-level information for all PSL origina-
tions made by the nine largest PSL lenders between 2005 and 2011. The 
data are de-identifi ed but include borrowers’ and coborrowers’ credit 
scores, amount borrowed, the student’s year in school, and the name 
of the school the student is attending. We merge these data to DOE 
administrative data sources that provide school-level information about 
federal student loans as well as institutional characteristics.
Lenders use most of these variables in their underwriting. Credit 
scores in particular are highly correlated with loan grants and pricing. 
However, we do not observe all variables that lenders have available 
for underwriting purposes. For example, lenders may have asked about 
coborrowers’ employment or income or have included information 
from a credit report (e.g., the fact that someone has a large number of 
credit cards) that we do not observe. The granular information from the 
credit report is “baked in” the credit score number, but income is not. 
We fi nd that excluding PSLs from discharge in bankruptcy decreased 
the average credit score of borrowers and increased the volume of loans 
but also increased the overall cost of loans. This latter fi nding runs 
counter to general economic theory as well as the arguments of both 
proponents and opponents of BAPCPA. Specifi cally, we fi nd that the 
credit score composition of borrowers after the law changed skewed 
toward the lower end of the credit score spectrum, but the average bor-
rower credit score only decreased slightly in practical terms. We also 
fi nd that the overall cost of PSLs at four-year undergraduate institutions 
increased by an average of 35 basis points (0.35 percent) as a result of 
the law change. Finally, we observe that the volume of loans originated 
tripled after BAPCPA and fi nd that 60 percent of that increase is attrib-
utable to the law change.
The fi rst section of this chapter provides some background on PSLs 
and a brief literature review. The second section describes the compet-
ing theories predicting the effect of BAPCPA on credit and bankrupt-
cies. The third section describes our unique data set, its limitations, and 
our empirical strategy. We report our results in the fourth section. Fol-
lowing that, we attempt to explain our surprising fi ndings and consider 
welfare implications. We conclude by discussing next steps.
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BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
Since 1976, federal student loans have received some form of 
bankruptcy protection. The stated purpose when the fi rst restriction 
on the dischargeability of federal loans passed in Congress was a con-
cern that students were using bankruptcy opportunistically to wipe out 
their student debt on the eve of a “lucrative career.”24 There has never 
been empirical evidence of widespread strategic default with regard to 
student loans. Even as far back as 1977, the evidence pointed to the 
contrary—strategic defaults are a rarity.25 Nonetheless, by 1998, fed-
eral loans became nondischargeable “unless excepting [them] from 
discharge . . . would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the 
debtor’s dependents.”26 In 2005, PSLs were added to the list.27 In this 
section, we explain the legal implications of this treatment and put it in 
context of the empirical studies that have examined its effect to date.
Congress never elaborated on the meaning of “undue hardship.” 
The sole mention of the phrase in the congressional record comes from 
opponents of the amendments who called it “vague” and argued that 
the provision itself “may create an undue hardship for good faith bank-
rupts” because “the standard is a very hard one. It will be very diffi -
cult to meet. Worse, it will be variously interpreted by different judges 
around the country and even in the same judicial district.”28 As we dis-
cuss below, there is some evidence that this is what happened.
The nondischargeability provision has been amended fi ve times 
with the same “undue hardship” language, with no clarifi cation from 
Congress.29 In the meantime, courts have settled on two interpretations 
of the phrase. Almost all courts use the fairly rigid Brunner test to eval-
uate whether a debtor can overcome the presumptive nondischargeabil-
ity of student loans. 30 Rebutting the presumption can be a diffi cult task. 
To do so, the debtor must fi le an “adversary proceeding” (effectively a 
lawsuit) with the bankruptcy court against her student loan creditors. 
She must convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence that 
repaying her loans would present an undue hardship. 31 The bankruptcy 
court must determine whether the debtor has met the threshold for dis-
chargeability, even if the creditor does not respond to the suit.32 If the 
debtor loses the lawsuit, or does not fi le one in the fi rst place, her stu-
dent loans are unaffected by the bankruptcy.33 
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A handful of empirical studies have examined debtors seeking to 
discharge student loans in bankruptcy and how they fared in the courts. 
Three key fi ndings pertain to this study: 1) an almost infi nitesimal num-
ber of student loan borrowers seek to discharge their student loans in 
bankruptcy; 2) discharge seekers are outliers—they have high educa-
tional debt relative to the population and fi nd themselves in especially 
miserable situations; and 3) about half of discharge seekers are suc-
cessful, but the reasons for their success are not entirely explainable by 
objective factors.
Only a handful of individuals attempt to discharge their student 
loans in bankruptcy. In the only nationwide study on the subject, Jason 
Iuliano estimates that of the individuals who fi led bankruptcy in 2007, 
only 0.1 percent had student loans and sought to discharge those loans.34 
That percent amounted to 213 individuals out of the 169,774 who fi led 
a bankruptcy case in 2007 and had a student loan.35 
Based on Iuliano’s study as well as two studies from Rafael Pardo 
and Michelle Lacey, we can establish a picture of the “typical” dis-
charge seeker. 36 All three studies fi nd that the average discharge seeker 
is over 41 years old, well past typical college age.37 Between 62 and 80 
percent of discharge seekers were unmarried, but most had one or more 
dependents, which is suggestive of a number of single-parent house-
holds.38 Fewer discharge seekers tended to be employed at the time 
they fi le bankruptcy relative to the rest of the bankrupt population.39 
Unsurprisingly, discharge seekers are in more fi nancial distress. “They 
make less money, own fewer assets, and have more liabilities, including 
educational debt” than nondischarge seekers.40 The average educational 
debt load varies between $47,137 in the oldest study to $80,476 in the 
study with the most recent data.41 Discharge seekers are also in dire 
straits: more than half of them suffered from a medical condition them-
selves or had one or more dependents with a condition.42 The majority 
of the discharge seekers seem to have tried various avenues to mitigate 
or resolve their student debt issues before fi ling bankruptcy.43
Discharge seekers are more often than not successful in obtaining 
at least a partial discharge: 57 percent of the adversary proceedings in 
Pardo and Lacey’s study of bankruptcy cases fi led between 2002 and 
2006 in the Western District of Washington resulted in at least a partial 
discharge.44 In Iuliano’s study, 39 percent (or 81 individuals out of the 
almost 1 million nationwide bankruptcies in 2007) received either a 
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full or a partial discharge of their student loans.45 This may seem like 
favorable odds, but it is likely a result of a selection bias. The more 
downtrodden and unfortunate, the more likely one might be to seek a 
discharge. These odds are nonetheless hard to predict: Pardo and Lacey 
argue that the undue hardship standard is not applied consistently.46 
Their 2005 study fi nds few statistically signifi cant differences between 
debtors who were granted a discharge of their student loans versus 
those who were denied.47 Troubling from an equal justice perspective, 
Pardo and Lacey also fi nd that “factors unrelated to the command of the 
law (e.g., the identity of the judge assigned to the debtor’s adversary 
proceeding), rather than factors deemed relevant by the legal doctrine 
(e.g., the debtor’s income and expenses), account for the substantive 
outcomes” in the case.48 
Iuliano and Pardo and Lacey’s studies do not distinguish between 
federal and private loans, but they nonetheless give us a sense of who 
might seek and who might get their student loans discharged. Only one 
study has examined the effect of the bankruptcy reform on the avail-
ability of PSLs. 49 Mark Krantowitz from the Web site FinAid.org issued 
a report shortly after the law came into effect fi nding a small expansion 
in loan availability to borrowers with lower FICO scores. 50 Using data 
from student loan securitizations,51 he found a 1.2 percent increase in 
loans to borrowers with FICO scores less than 650 (typically considered 
subprime borrowers) after BAPCPA.52 However, when looking only at 
loans originated without a coborrower, Krantowitz found that credit 
contracted after BAPCPA by 1.7 percent for subprime borrowers. He 
also found a modest increase (5.2 percent) in PSL availability to bor-
rowers with a FICO score between 651 and 710 (generally considered 
prime).53 Krantowitz also found that in some of his sample the average 
FICO score post-BAPCPA dropped from 719 to 715, further indicating 
a slight credit expansion to borrowers with lower creditworthiness.54
Until now, Krantowitz’s report has been the only analysis attempt-
ing to answer the question of the effect of BAPCPA on the pricing and 
availability of private student loans. His fi ndings that credit moderately 
expanded are consistent with the hypotheses we discuss in the next part 
of this chapter.
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Under the dominant legal and economic theory behind the latest 
round of bankruptcy reform, the “easy” availability of bankruptcy was 
thought to have one of two effects: increasing the cost of credit for 
everyone to account for strategic borrowers or rationing credit, leading 
to a suboptimal amount of available credit. Opponents of bankruptcy 
reform, on the other hand, argued that there was no empirical evidence 
for this view: household credit increased dramatically, even as bank-
ruptcy fi lings were increasing in the late 1990s. In their view, lenders 
in particular stopped rationing credit as early as the 1980s, just after the 
Supreme Court effectively lifted usury cap restrictions and after credit 
scoring had improved enough that lenders were better able to identify 
high-risk borrowers.55 Each of these predicted effects yields some intu-
itions about what might happen to the cost of credit (specifi cally PSLs) 
post-BAPCPA. In this part, we develop three models to more formally 
theorize the expected result from the increased protection of PSLs in 
bankruptcy. In a later section, we compare the models’ predictions to 
our results and discuss the similarities and (surprising) differences.
The majority of the 2005 bankruptcy reforms were directly respon-
sive to a view of the world that assumed consumers were not only per-
fectly rational but also engaging in strategic behavior. We refer to this 
as the “bankruptcy tax” view. According to this view, strategic consum-
ers impose a cost on the system by forcing lenders to either pass on 
the cost of opportunism to borrowers as a whole or ration credit. Por-
tions of BAPCPA, including the PSL nondischargeable provision, were 
designed to ameliorate these problems. Some BAPCPA proponents 
posited that current strategic behavior was causing a “bankruptcy tax” 
of “$400-a-year on every household in the country.”56 Alternatively 
or in conjunction with a bankruptcy tax, lenders may ration credit in 
a world where bankruptcy is easy “in order to maintain underwriting 
standards.”57 One of the aims of bankruptcy reform was to reduce the 
number of opportunistic borrowers. In support of BAPCPA, Judge Pos-
ner theorized that “by increasing the rights of creditors in bankruptcy . . . 
[bankruptcy reform] should reduce interest rates and thus make borrow-
ers better off.”58 
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We can model this straightforwardly. Let x be a measure of the 
credit quality of a borrower and f(x) denote the probability with which 
type x borrowers repay their loans, regardless of the loan amount. Let r 
be one plus the rate of return of the loan for the creditor conditional on 
the borrower repaying their loan,59 and let c(x) be the average recovery 
rate of loans that are not repaid in full.60 For these purposes, assume 
that repayment rates and the average proportion repaid are increasing in 
x, so f’(x) > 0 and c’(x) > 0. Let z(r) represent the original balance of a 
loan a borrower is willing to accept, which depends on the interest rate. 
Assume also that consumers are risk averse, so that z'(r) and z"(r) < 0.
Further assume that the creditor is risk neutral and rational. Then for 
each borrower of type x, the creditor maximizes expected repayment or 
recovery net of the loan amount, as shown in Equation (7.1). 
(7.1) 
A rational, risk-neutral creditor will only originate a loan for which 
expected repayment net of loan amount is nonnegative such that
(7.2) 
As the average recovery rate of the loans not repaid in full, c(x) 
increases, the right-hand side of Equation (7.2) decreases, so if repay-
ment rates are increased by BAPCPA, creditors would be willing to 
make loans to borrowers with lower values of x, so access to credit 
should expand.
Taking the fi rst order conditions of Equation (7.1) and then differ-
entiating implicitly yields Equation (7.3),
(7.3) 
This implies that for any type x borrower, rates of returns condi-
tional on borrowers repaying the loan in full should decrease if bank-
ruptcy protection increases the recovery rate of loans that default, which 
would correspond to a decrease in interest rates for borrowers of all lev-
els of credit quality, as shown in Figure 7.1, which illustrates the equi-
librium price schedule for a PSL of a given size by credit quality. Prior 
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to BAPCPA, P0 traces out the relationship between the cost of credit, 
captured by r, and credit quality, x. After BAPCPA, the increase in c(x), 
the return given less than full payment at a given interest rate, result-
ing from higher rates of recovery conditional on bankruptcy, should be 
offset by a decrease in interest rates for borrowers, so the price sched-
ule shifts from P0 to P1. Note that the size of the decrease may vary by 
credit quality. 
Consider the case where the borrower is von Neumann-Morgenstern 
(VNM) rational, as assumed by proponents of bankruptcy reform.61 In 
that case, his utility function can be expressed as 
U(z,r;x) = g(x)u(z,r) + (1 − g[x])v(z,r), 
where g(x) is the borrower’s ex ante belief about the probability that he 
will repay the loan, u(z,r) is the expected utility from successfully being 
able to pay back his loan when he borrows z at interest rate r − 1, and 
v(z,r) is his expected utility of not being able to pay back a loan that he 
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borrows at these terms. The larger the loan, the better off he is when he 
is able to pay it back, so u1 > 0, and the worse off he is when he is unable 
to pay it back, so v1 < 0. From the fi rst order conditions
 
, 
which implicitly defi nes z(r). Note that consumer overoptimism or pos-
itive cognitive bias can be captured by g(x) > f(x). In other words, the 
borrower’s belief about his ability to repay the loan is greater than his 
actual probability of repaying the loan.
The new treatment of PSLs in bankruptcy—making them pre-
sumptively nondischargeable and effectively very unlikely to be dis-
charged—makes the consequences of default more severe; a severity 
that increases with the size of the loan. We model this as the expected 
utility of not being able to repay a loan, v(z,r), becoming v̂(z,r), and v̂1. 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the effect of BAPCPA on the supply of and demand 
for PSL for a borrower of a fi xed credit quality, x. Assuming that ability-
to-repay conditional on credit quality is not affected by BAPCPA—that 
is, there is no additional strategic default after BAPCPA—then g(x) is 
unchanged and 
,
so ẑ < z.62 This implies that the VNM borrower’s demand curve shifts 
down, as illustrated in Figure 7.2. Supply responds as described in 
Equation (7.3) and shifts from S0 to S1.
63 Equilibrium moves from E0 
to Ê1.
Note that the magnitude of this shift is determined by the relation-
ship between the change in the expected utility of not being able to 
repay a loan and the average recovery rate of loans that are not repaid in 
full, c(x), so, a priori, it is not possible to determine whether loan sizes 
will increase, decrease, or remain the same as a result of BAPCPA. 
Similar to Judge Posner’s prediction for the law change, this simple 
model would thus predict that the price of the loans—in our parlance, 
the loan margin—will decrease after the law change and the effects on 
credit quality and volume are an empirical question.
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As an alternative model, we also consider credit provision in the 
private student loan market in a Stiglitz-Weiss model in Appendix 7C.64 
For this model to hold, we assume that there is credit rationing in the 
private student loan market, as some BAPCPA proponents argued.65 
The Stiglitz-Weiss model predicts that the cost of credit will remain 
the same (because of rationing); the supply of credit will increase 
(increased volume of loans originated, as opposed to the ambiguous 
effect on quantity in the simple model); and that lenders will on average 
lend to riskier borrowers (in our data, lower credit scores).66
Opponents of BAPCPA have argued that the assumptions of strate-
gic rationality on the part of consumers are too simplistic. Incorporating 
behavioral research fi ndings and empirical research of actual debtors in 
bankruptcy, Susan Block-Lieb and Edward Janger propose a behavioral 
model of consumer bankruptcy that relaxes the assumption of consumer 
rationality but retains the assumption of lender rationality.67 This is cap-
tured by the model presented above, since f(x) and g(x) can differ. Posi-
tive consumer biases, including optimism, present bias, and probability 
neglect, correspond to cases where g(x) > f(x).
Figure 7.2  Effects of BAPCPA on Supply and Demand of PSL for 
Consumers of a Fixed Credit Quality
r
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If we assume, for example, that borrowers are present biased, then 
they focus on the interest rate, and do not fully consider their probabil-
ity of bankruptcy or the consequences of BAPCPA upon bankruptcy.68 
These behaviors could be captured by setting g(x) = 1 (assuming that a 
borrower believes he will defi nitely repay the loan) or by setting v̂ (z,r) 
= v(z,r) (borrower ignores the consequences of bankruptcy), respec-
tively. This would mean that borrowers’ demand curves do not shift 
in response to BAPCPA. Instead, these loans will appear “cheaper” to 
borrowers because they are not fully accounting for the costs or are 
overly optimistic about their likelihood of repayment, and therefore 
loan originations and loan amounts should increase at any given credit 
quality, as shown in Figure 7.2. BAPCPA causes the supply curve to 
shift downward for individuals of credit quality x, which means that 
the price of credit, r, decreases. In response to this shift, the new equi-
librium moves along the demand curve from E0 to E1, so the loan size 
demanded increases, in contrast to the loan size decrease we see in Ê1, 
the case where borrowers internalize the cost of nondischargeability. 
Block-Lieb and Janger go further than this model. They theorize 
that “consumer lenders already provide a rebate of the bankruptcy tax” 
to subprime and less credit-worthy consumers.69 This model is really 
a special case of the competitive model with present-biased consumer 
above. If, as Block-Lieb and Janger predict, the charge-off rate does 
not change post BAPCPA, then c(x) does not change, and so the supply 
curve does not shift. Also, if consumers understand that c(x) does not 
change, or if they do not factor in nondischargeability in bankruptcy 
into v(z,r), the demand curve does not shift. Therefore, prices and bor-
rowing decisions will remain the same.
To summarize, depending on what assumptions we make and what 
model we use, we would expect a variety of different outcomes for 
the effect of the change to the bankruptcy laws making private student 
loans presumptively nondischargeable, as shown in Table 7.1. 
Incorporating all of these leads to the following hypotheses, which 
we test with our analysis: 
• H0 — Price, average credit quality or loan amount, and total loan 
volumes will remain the same. 
• H1 — Loan pricing (that is, lender margins) should remain the 
same or decrease for originations after the law change.
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• H2 — Lenders should be willing to lend to borrowers with lower 
credit quality than they were willing to lend before the law 
change.
• H3 — Overall loan volumes should increase. 
• H4 — Average loan amount should also increase independent of 
tuition and fees.












Price Decrease No change Decrease No change
Credit quality Decrease Decrease Decrease No change
Loan amount Ambiguous Increase Increase No change
Loan volume Ambiguous Increase Increase No change
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
Our data set was created by CFPB economists in preparation for 
the congressionally mandated report on PSLs issued in 2012.71 The data 
set includes PSL originations from the nine largest PSL lenders in the 
period between the fi rst quarter of 2005 and the last quarter of 2011.72 
The data do not allow us to identify the lender for a given loan, but it 
does contain origination information at the individual loan level. The 
variables available in the data set include the loan amount, credit score 
of the borrower, credit score of any coborrowers, interest rate for fi xed-
rate loans, margin and the index used for variable rate loans, and the 
state of residence of the borrower.73 This data set was merged to two 
public administrative data sets maintained by the Department of Educa-
tion: the Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS) and the 
Postsecondary Education Participants System (PEPS).74 IPEDS “gath-
ers information from every college, university, and technical and voca-
tional institution that participates in the federal student fi nancial aid 
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programs.”75 It includes data on “enrollments, program completions, 
graduation rates, faculty and staff, fi nances, institutional prices, and stu-
dent fi nancial aid programs.”76 The PEPS data include school-level data 
on topics such as school characteristics, cohort default rates, and eli-
gibility status.77 We used these additional variables in the school-level 
analysis.
In order to compare PSLs to federal loans for the difference-in-
differences (DD) analysis, we also made use of data from the DOE’s 
Title IV Program Volume Reports for Direct Loans and Federal Fam-
ily Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans at the school level in the 
2004–2005 and 2005–2006 academic years.78
While the PSL data set includes originations on a variety of school 
types, for purposes of this study, we restricted the data set to origina-
tions for undergraduates at four-year institutions from the fi rst quarter 
of 2005 and 2006. We limited ourselves to this smaller (though still con-
siderable) sample because we thought the heterogeneity of school and 
program type (certifi cate, medical school, law school) might obscure 
the effect. We also limit ourselves to this time period to avoid confl ating 
the effects of other major policy changes, such as the 2006 implementa-
tion of the Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005, which modi-
fi ed eligibility and application requirements for Title IV funds, with the 
effects of BAPCPA.79
Our outcome variables include the credit worthiness of student loan 
applicants (measured by the highest FICO score between the borrower 
and coborrower), the margins (interest above the index), the lender 
charged on the loan, the size of the loan, and the total number of loans 
originated. Table 7.2 presents summary statistics for private student 
loans originated in the fi rst quarter of 2005 (before the law changed) 
and the fi rst quarter of 2006 (after the law changed). Of note is the 
overall small reduction in mean and median FICO scores in 2006; this 
is true both for borrower FICO scores and for maximum FICO score 
(if the borrower applied with a coborrower, the maximum of the two 
scores). The average original balance and the number of loans origi-
nated increased; the latter more than tripled in the postperiod. 
In Figure 7.3, we plot the distribution of maximum FICO scores 
before and after BAPCPA. We observe that the distribution shifts 
slightly to the left, so that FICO scores decrease after BAPCPA.
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Figure 7.4 displays the changes in margins between the fi rst quarter 
before the law change and the same quarter one year later. Before the 
law changed, some lenders were originating PSLs that had a zero or 
below zero margin; in other words, they were not charging a premium 
above the index for some loans. After the law changed, surprisingly, 
premium-free or less-than-index loans were no longer being originated, 
and the distribution shifts toward higher margins.
Figure 7.5 presents the distribution of the original balances of the 
loans originated in the fi rst quarter before the law changed (Q1 2005) 
and the same quarter after the law changed (Q1 2006). Original bal-
ances are positively skewed in both time periods, but slightly higher 
after BAPCPA.
Table 7.2  Summary Statistics for Loans Originated in the First Quarter 
of 2005 and First Quarter of 2006
  
Before BAPCPA
(Q1 2005)  
After BAPCPA
(Q1 2006)
Mean Median Mean Median
Has a coborrower 0.80
(0.40)
1 0.82 1



































Loans originated 4,960 15,318
NOTE: Maximum FICO score is the maximum of the borrower and all coborrower 
scores. Standard deviations in parentheses. Restricted to loans originated in the fi rst 
quarter of 2005 and 2006 to undergraduates at four-year institutions for which a bor-
rower or coborrower’s FICO score was reported.
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Figure 7.3  Distribution of Maximum FICO Scores Shifts toward Less 



















































































































Maximum FICO score among borrowers and coborrowers
After BAPCPA
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of CFPB private student loan data.
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SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of CFPB private student loan data.
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SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of CFPB private student loan data.
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Limitations
The available data impose some limitations on our analysis. The 
fi rst limitation is related to the timing of bankruptcy reform, the second 
with the available data.
First, bankruptcy reforms, including changes to the dischargeability 
of PSLs, were debated in Congress as early as the mid-1990s, and by 
1999 and 2000, the House and Senate had passed bills that included lan-
guage adding PSLs to the list of presumptively nondischargeable loans 
in bankruptcy. These bills were vetoed by President Clinton in 2000.80 
The upsurge of Republican congressional members in the 2004 election 
and the public support of bankruptcy reform by sitting President Bush 
meant that the bill, as one newspaper phrased it in an opinion piece a 
month before the bill’s passage, “gained the momentum of a runaway 
freight train.”81 The bill was introduced in the Senate on February 1, 
2005, passed by both houses on April 14, 2005, was signed into law by 
President Bush on April 20, 2005, and became effective on October 17, 
2005.82 
Despite the lack of a “surprise” factor for the law change, lenders 
are unlikely to have made preemptive changes to their underwriting 
algorithms, primarily because by doing so they could lose the benefi t 
afforded by the law’s protection for at least some of the loans they would 
originate in anticipation. This is because BAPCPA did not apply retro-
actively: PSLs were not affected unless and until a bankruptcy case was 
fi led after the law became effective. This means that PSLs only became 
presumptively nondischargeable for bankruptcies that were fi led on 
or after October 17, 2005, and they became so regardless of when the 
loans were originated.83 Prior to that date, the loans were dischargeable 
like most other forms of unsecured debt, such as credit card debts. 
Our earliest data are from Q1 2005, before the law was passed or 
took effect. The law took effect at the very end of Q3 2005, so we use 
Q1 2006 as the effective postperiod. Figure 7.6 shows the timeline of 
the law changes and the available data.
We note one additional limitation to using fi rst-quarter origina-
tions. Because the academic year traditionally runs from August to 
May, many student loans are originated over the summer or the fall. 
Beyond the fact that there are fewer originations in Q1 than Q3, loans 
originated in Q1 differ from loans originated in other quarters. Table 7.3 
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presents a comparison of fi rst quarter 2006 originations to third-quarter 
originations in 2005 and 2006. Columns (2)–(5) present the results for 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the outcome variables with 
controls for quarter of origination and school fi xed effects. Compared to 
fi rst-quarter loans, third-quarter loans tend to have signifi cantly larger 
original balances, are more likely to be originated through the school 
channel, are more likely to be made with coborrowers, and have slightly 
higher maximum FICO scores. To mitigate these seasonal differences, 
we restrict our analysis to comparing Q1 2005 data (the fi rst quarter 
available) to Q1 2006 data. 
Empirical Strategy
We analyze changes in loan characteristics—that is, changes in 
loan amount, debtor credit quality, and margin (risk premium cost)—at 
the loan level. We implement three methods in this analysis: 1) OLS 
regression, 2) Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, and 3) propensity-score 
matching. We then collapse the data and analyze the volume of loans 
originated at the school level using the same three methods and also 
perform a DD analysis using volumes of federal loans as a comparison 
for PSL volumes.
Loan-level analysis
We can think of the price and terms of credit in terms of the expected 
returns for the creditor conditional on repayment, the amount of the loan 
extended, and the credit quality of the borrower. In our data set, these 
characteristics most closely correspond to margin (the risk premium),84 
Figure 7.6  Major Events in Bankruptcy Reform and Our Data Set 
Observations
April 20, 2005
BAPCPA signed into law
October 17, 2005
Effective date of BAPCPA





10/04 1/05 4/05 7/05 10/05 1/06 4/06 7/06
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original balance, and the maximum FICO scores among borrowers and 
coborrowers on a loan.85 To evaluate how these characteristics changed 
as a result of BAPCPA, we implement three techniques.
As a fi rst approach, we run OLS regressions of these characteristics, 
y, on post, a dummy variable for receiving a loan after the implementa-
tion of BAPCPA, and a vector of control variables, X, that would be 
included in an underwriting model, such as type of school attended, 
tuition and fees, credit score, year in school, and a constant, as shown 
in Equation (7.5).86 The sample is restricted to individuals with valid 
FICO scores, as this is the dominant measure of creditworthiness used 
in the data set.
(7.5) yi = βpost posti + βx Xi + εi
Note that H2 discussed in the analytical framework implies that the 
coeffi cient on βpost < 0 when the outcome under consideration is the 
maximum credit score among all borrowers and H1 implies that at each 
maximum credit score, the interest rate should decrease, so βpost < 0. 
Table 7.3  OLS Regressions Comparing First-Quarter 2006 Originations 
with Third-Quarter 2006 Originations












2005 Q3 37,795 1,927*** 0.0420*** 0.0250*** 6.563***
(78.89) (0.00388) (0.00356) (0.473)
2006 Q3 26,127 2,689*** 0.00796** 0.0499*** 1.798***
(74.17) (0.00365) (0.00334) (0.445)
Constant 9,936*** 0.248*** 0.821*** 716.5***
(61.80) (0.00304) (0.00279) (0.371)
Observations 79,913 79,939 79,939 79,939
R2 0.148 0.293 0.079 0.098
NOTE:*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Restricted 
to four-year undergraduates in the fi rst quarter of 2006 and the third quarters of 2005 
and 2006. Columns (2) through (5) represent separate OLS regressions and include 
school-level fi xed effects.
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(7.6)  
We also perform this analysis with interactions between school and 
borrower characteristics, which are observable to the creditor, and an 
indicator for the postperiod. Let Xi be a vector of school or borrower 
characteristics, . Then the interaction terms 
can be written as in Equation (7.6). For a borrower with characteristics 
Xi , the estimated effect of BAPCPA on the outcome variables is given 
by 
Effectively, βj × post can be interpreted as the contribution of having 
one more unit of xj to the magnitude of the effect of the policy. For 
example, if two borrowers have identical characteristics except that one 
has a coborrower and the other does not, we would expect the effect of 
BAPCPA on their outcomes to differ by βcoborrower × post on average.
Since the lender data set only contains data for originated loans, one 
concern is that the composition of borrowers in the data set may change 
in response to changes in the loan offers by creditors. In order to sepa-
rately identify effects due to changes in terms for borrowers who would 
have received loans in the absence of BAPCPA and the effects of the 
change in the composition of borrowers, we employ two techniques: the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and propensity score matching.
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition was initially developed in 
the context of wage discrimination, where wages are only observed 
for individuals who are employed.87 In the context of this study, we 
consider the group that was exposed to BAPCPA, that is, borrowers 
who received loans in the fi rst quarter of 2006.88 First, we run regres-
sions of the outcome variables on their characteristics for both samples 
restricted to the pre group, which received loans before BAPCPA (in 
Q1 2005), and the post group, which received loans after BAPCPA (in 
Q1 2006), as in Equations (7.7) and (7.8). 
(7.7) 
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(7.8) 
An estimate of the difference in average loan terms for the groups 
due to the changes in the characteristics of the individuals in the group 
(“endowments”) is captured in the fi rst term on the right-hand side of 
Equation (7.9). An estimate of the effects of the program on the loan 
terms for individuals who would receive loans in the absence of BAP-
CPA is captured by the effect due to coeffi cients in the second term 
of the right-hand side of Equation (7.9). The effect due to coeffi cients 
can be thought of as the change in how the underlying underwriting 
model classifi es borrowers with a certain set of observable characteris-
tics (e.g., a certain credit score).
(7.9) 
It follows that for margins, the effect due to the program corre-
sponds to an average of the effects characterized by H2. These results 
are invariant to omitted reference groups when dummy variables are 
added; that is, the program effect estimates do not vary with the omitted 
category when we use indicator variables for the values of a categorical 
variable as controls.89 Since Kline has shown that the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition is a reweighting estimator, we can also interpret the 
Blinder-Oaxaca results causally.90
To further isolate the effect of BAPCPA, we use propensity score 
matching methods to understand its effect on individuals who received 
loans after BAPCPA but who, based on their observable characteris-
tics, would have been approved for loans in the absence of BAPCPA. 
We estimate the effects on this population using nearest-neighbor pro-
pensity score matching, matching observations from the fi rst quarter 
of 2006 with a single observation from the fi rst quarter of 2005. This 
allows us to reduce the bias due to potential confounding variables.
During this time period, underwriting of student loans was largely 
based on automated underwriting and primarily based on the charac-
teristics we observe—namely, credit score, amount of loan, and school 
characteristics. In other words, conditional on borrower and coborrower 
characteristics, approval for a loan is deterministic because lenders are 
making decisions based on observable characteristics run through an 
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algorithm. We thus have reason to believe that propensity score meth-
ods are appropriate because our sample satisfi es the strong ignorability 
and conditional independence assumptions in Equation (7.10), where S 
is post-BAPCPA status, as discussed in Rosenbaum and Rubin.91 
(7.10) 
(7.11) 
The effect of the program on individuals in the common support of 
the characteristics of those observed in the pre- and postperiods can be 
estimated by Equation (7.11), where τ is the treatment effect and p is 
the propensity score estimated by a probit regression, and S = 1 if the 
individual is observed post BAPCPA and 0 otherwise.92 
H2 implies that the composition of borrowers may change, owing 
to the availability of credit to individuals who would not have been 
offered credit prior to the policy change. Lenders’ ex ante assessment 
of borrower credit quality, x, may be determined by multiple factors, 
including credit score, school attended, and year in school. Therefore, 
there may be differences in the observable characteristics of borrowers 
between the pre- and postperiods. The propensity score analysis thus 
cannot tell us anything about the type of borrower that is able to get a 
loan after BAPCPA. It can only tell us the effect of BAPCPA on bor-
rowers in the fi rst quarter of 2006 that would have been approved for a 
loan before the law changed. 
School-level analysis
To test the hypothesis that loan volumes increase because of BAP-
CPA, H3, we collapse our loan origination data set to the school level. 
Since our unit of observation is now a school, we are able to use the 
three methods described above—1) OLS, 2) Blinder-Oaxaca, and 3) 
propensity-score matching—to examine loan volumes. We also imple-
ment a DD strategy using federal loan volumes for comparison.
First we compare the log number of private student loans in the 
lender data sample at each school in the preperiod to the postperiod. 
Note that in order to understand the magnitude of the effect, we must 
exponentiate the coeffi cients on post in the OLS specifi cation and 
the analogues in the Oaxaca decomposition and the propensity score 
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matching models. We also run a school fi xed effects model in order to 
consider the within school effects. All models are weighted by full-time 
equivalent enrollments. 
We also perform a DD analysis using available information on the 
volume of both Direct and FFELP Loans at a given school for the 2004–
2005 and 2005–2006 academic years. We assume that in the absence 
of BAPCPA, the change in PSLs would parallel the change in federal 
loans and that the change in federal loans is proportional across quar-
ters. We can then estimate the effect of the program on loan volumes 
using a DD strategy. We believe that our assumption of PSL volume 
moving in a parallel fashion to federal loan volume in the absence of 
BAPCPA is likely, since they are subject to the same demand shocks, 
such as enrollments and changes in tuition costs. Although we do not 
have quarterly data for federal loans, annual average loans per student 
grew steadily from 2000 through 2005.93
We combine Direct Loan and FFELP Loan totals at the institution-
year level, append the resultant data set to the school-level origination 
data, and merge the appropriate IPEDS and PEPS data at the institution-
year level. We then consider PSLs the treated group, so the coeffi cient 
of interest is βpsl×post in Equation (7.12), and the comparison groups are 
subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford Loans, Parental PLUS Loans, 
combined Stafford Loans, and all federal loans. We use a similar strat-
egy to estimate the effects of the program on average loan size at a given 
school by stacking the loan-level origination data with the Title IV Pro-
gram Volume Reports and weighting by the number of originations.94
(7.12) 
One challenge with using federal loans as controls for PSLs arises 
from the fact that federal loans have defi ned maximum loan amounts.95 
This means that loan demand for federal loans is effectively top-coded, 
which leads to downward bias in estimates of .96 As a result, as 
shown in Appendix 7B, we are likely to underestimate the true effect 
with the DD analysis.
We make two assumptions in our DD analysis. This is necessary, 
since data on federal loans are only available at the academic-year level. 
These assumptions are illustrated in Figure 7.6. First, we assume that all 
of the federal student loans originated in academic year 2004–2005 are 
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originated by April 20, 2005. It is likely that the majority of federal loans 
are originated by this point in time, since the academic year ends at the 
close of the second quarter, and the law took effect midway through the 
second quarter. This allows us to associate academic year 2004–2005 
with the pre-BAPCPA period and academic year 2005–2006 with the 
post-BAPCPA period. Second, we assume that at any given institution, 
the proportion of the academic year’s federal loans originated is con-
stant: if x percent of academic year 2004–2005 federal loans at school y 
are made in Q1 2005, then x percent of academic year 2005–2006 fed-
eral loans at school y are made in Q1 2006. Similarly, we assume either 
that the absolute difference or the proportional difference in average 
federal loan size between quarters is constant within schools across aca-
demic years, in the specifi cations that consider average original balance 
and log original balance, respectively. Academic year volumes are a 
noisy measure of quarterly volumes, which means our results are biased 
toward zero, and the true effect is likely larger than what we observe.97
RESULTS
We analyzed the loans originated in the fi rst quarters of 2005 and 
2006 using OLS regression, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, and pro-
pensity score matching. These methods produced similar results dis-
played in Appendix 7A, Tables 7A.1–7A.5. All of the results we dis-
cuss in this section are statistically signifi cant to the 95 percent level or 
higher unless noted. 
Loan-Level Analysis
Table 7A.1 uses OLS to estimate Equation (7.5) for tuition and fees, 
with various combinations of controls for a borrower’s year in school, 
school type, maximum FICO scores, linear splines for FICO scores, 
and school fi xed effects.98 Once school fi xed effects are introduced, 
the results are stable across specifi cations. As predicted by H2, lenders 
are lending to borrowers who have worse credit after the law changed, 
as evidenced by the 5.3 point average decrease in FICO scores shown 
in column (3). Contrary to the prediction from H1 that for a given 
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credit quality the consumer price of borrowing will decrease owing to 
increased collections, the margins increase by 30 basis points in column 
(5). Mean original balance also increased by $1,189. 
Because of their credit quality, some applicants would have been 
able to receive a PSL both before and after BAPCPA. To understand 
how BAPCPA may have affected the borrower population through 
changes in underwriting, we turn to the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposi-
tion. The results displayed in Table 7A.2 show a 26 basis-point increase 
in margin but no signifi cant change in loan amount. In column (2) of 
Panel A, the 0.398 decrease in credit scores due to endowments sug-
gests that some of the characteristics of borrowers may have changed 
that resulted in average lower FICO scores. This result is statistically 
signifi cant at the 0.1 level but disappears when school fi xed effects are 
added in column (3). This suggests that the composition of schools to 
which the sample creditors are lending may have changed and merits 
further investigation. 
Consistent with the OLS results in Table 7A.1, column (5) of Panel 
B shows a within-school effect of a 35-basis-point increase in margins, 
11 basis points of which are attributable to changes in the composi-
tion of students (endowments in Blinder-Oaxaca terminology), and 26 
basis points of which are attributable to changes in underwriting (coef-
fi cients). Recall that we defi ned r as one plus the rate of return of the 
loan for the creditor conditional on the borrower repaying their loan. 
This suggests that for a given set of borrower characteristics, lenders 
are increasing r, so, inconsistent with the prediction from H1, lenders 
increased the price of loans in response to BAPCPA. 
Similarly, in Panel C, the overall change in original balance due to 
BAPCPA is insignifi cant, but changes in borrower characteristics pre-
dict a $116 increase in borrowing due to endowments (changes in the 
composition of students after the law changed).
Table 7A.3 presents the results from the propensity score match-
ing, where the propensity score is calculated by a probit regression of 
borrower characteristics on whether or not an individual appears in the 
post-BAPCPA observations. For each specifi cation, the raw difference 
in means is reported above the difference in means for the matched 
pairs, labeled as the average treatment on the treated effect. For maxi-
mum FICO scores, these results can be interpreted as the type of stu-
dents, based on schools attended and school year, that the lenders would 
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have successfully extended credit to pre-BAPCPA. The result in col-
umn (3) of a 4.2 point average decrease in FICO scores is consistent 
with the previous results and suggests that within a given school, lend-
ers are extending credit to individuals with slightly lower credit scores 
in the postperiod. 
For margins and original balances, the results in Table 7A.3 can be 
interpreted as the effects of the program on the loan terms of individuals 
who would have been granted loans prior to BAPCPA, based on their 
characteristics. Consistent with the OLS and Blinder-Oaxaca result, the 
result in column (5) suggests a 30-basis-point increase in the average 
margin experienced by a borrower. As also shown in that column, aver-
age original balances increased by $1,157 post-BAPCPA. 
Overall, these results suggest that credit did expand to some indi-
viduals who previously did not have access to private student loans 
prior to BAPCPA either because of their observable credit quality 
through their FICO scores or the characteristics of the schools that they 
attended. This is consistent with H2, and as can be seen from Figure 7.3, 
it was signifi cant to a number of borrowers with low credit scores. Con-
sistent with the previous methods presented, margins actually increase 
by a signifi cant amount post-BAPCPA. This is inconsistent with the 
theoretical prediction of H1 that the price of loans, as captured by the 
margin, should not increase, since collection given bankruptcy should 
increase the value of defaulted loans for creditors. 
School-Level Analysis
As predicted by H3, when we collapse our data set to the school 
level, we observe a signifi cant increase in the volume of PSLs after the 
implementation of BAPCPA. As shown in Table 7A.4, once we control 
for school characteristics, including tuition and fees, graduation rates, 
Carnegie classifi cation, log full-time equivalent students, and the per-
cent of the student body that is black and Hispanic, we observe a 174.3 
percent increase in PSL originations in the OLS specifi cation in column 
(6) of Panel A.99 The corresponding Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in 
column (6) of Panel B suggests that a 192.1 percent increase is due to 
a change in underwriting due to BAPCPA.100 Similarly, the propensity 
score matching result yields a 215.2 percent increase in loans due to 
BAPCPA in column (6) of Panel C. 
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An OLS regression of log borrowers on BAPCPA with school fi xed 
effects, restricted to students at schools where the creditors issued loans 
before the policy change, yields an estimate of a 243.0 percent increase 
in loan volumes. Note that these volumes may be attenuated owing 
to measurement error and may underestimate the effect of the policy 
change, since we do not observe other fi rms that enter due to the con-
struction of the sample.101
The DD results for loan volumes in Table 7A.5 are qualitatively 
similar to estimates in Table 7A.4. With all of our comparison groups, 
we observe an approximate 60 percent increase in the number of pri-
vate student loan originations, and a similar increase in the number of 
distinct borrowers in each loan type. When we compare average origi-
nal balance to Stafford Loan balances, we observe an effect of the law 
change of an approximately $600 increase in the average original bal-
ance of PSL. This is smaller than our point estimate using other tech-
niques, and we believe that that DD estimate may be biased downward, 
owing to the loan limits for federal loans.102 
We add Parent PLUS Loans as comparison in column (4) because 
they are a close substitute for PSLs, and because PLUS loan eligibility 
is based on the parents’ creditworthiness. Doing so leads us to esti-
mate a $121 decrease in the average size of the PSL. In our sample of 
PSLs the original rate is negatively correlated with original balance (ρ 
= −0.0975), so it is possible that marginal individuals who would have 
applied for smaller PLUS Loans in the absence of the policy change 
make have substituted PSLs for PLUS Loans because of potentially 
lower interest rates.103
DISCUSSION
Recall our hypotheses from Table 7.1. While not every model pre-
dicted every outcome of interest, those that did were heading in the 
same direction. Our prediction was that credit would expand; in other 
words, borrower credit quality would stay the same or decrease, and 
average loan amounts as well as the volume of loans would stay the 
same or increase. Our models predicted the prices would either stay the 
same or decrease. Our results are mostly consistent with these hypoth-
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eses: credit expanded among all dimensions after BAPCPA. The fi rst 
quarter after the law changed saw a dramatic 309 percent increase in the 
number of loans originated; we estimate that 60 percent of that increase 
was caused by BAPCPA.104 Additionally, borrowers with lower credit 
scores were moderately more able to obtain PSLs as a result of BAP-
CPA. The decrease in the average maximum credit score was small 
in magnitude, a drop similar to the effect of applying for two credit 
cards within a few days. Credit also expanded at the loan level; the 
average original balance of the loans increased by between $1,100 and 
$1,400, even after controlling for tuition and fees, year in school, hav-
ing a coborrower, maximum FICO score, and school fi xed effects. All 
of this is not unexpected. The most surprising fi nding of our study is 
that contrary to our hypotheses, both from the point of view of reform 
proponents and opponents, average loan prices (in our parlance, lender 
margins) increased during this period.105 Our estimates show that mar-
gins increased by between 30 and 40 basis points, even for students 
who would have received a loan before BAPCPA. 
An expansion of credit coupled with an increase in price sounds 
eerily similar to what happened in other consumer credit markets dur-
ing the pre-Great Recession bubble. The secondary market for all con-
sumer credit—mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, etc.—increased 
dramatically before the Great Recession. Consumer credit ABS issu-
ances peaked before 2005, but it is widely theorized that, securitization 
demand drove both an expansion of credit as well as an increase in 
prices in markets such as housing.106 One potential story here is that 
we are not observing BAPCPA so much as securitization demand. This 
account would be consistent with Block-Lieb and Janger’s prediction 
that lenders would not relax underwriting standards or originate more 
loans after BAPCPA because they had no reason to expect increased 
charge-offs after the law changed.107 If BAPCPA did not cause shifts 
in supply, then lenders would have only relaxed their underwriting cri-
teria in order to meet the demand from the securitization market. We 
cannot discount that securitization had an effect on our fi ndings; how-
ever, as we discuss below, we fi nd evidence that is inconsistent with this 
hypothesis. 
As shown in Figure 7.7, PSL Asset Backed Securities (PSLABS) 
outstandings increased in a steep linear fashion between 2003 and 2007. 
We note that the growth in outstandings in the period we studied (repre-
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sented by the vertical lines in Figure 7.7) is similar to that in the period 
that came before it (2004–2005) and after 2006–2007. In other words, 
PSLABS were increasing steadily between 2003 and 2007.
Given this stable increase, we compare our results among our four 
outcomes of interest (maximum FICO score between borrower or 
coborrower, margin charged on the loan, original balance of the loan, 
and the volume of loans originated) between the fi rst quarters strad-
dling bankruptcy reform (Q1 2005 to Q1 2006) and the same quarters 
one year after reform (Q1 2006 to Q1 2007).109 Table 7.4 reports the 
raw means for the three periods.110 Credit expands the year after the law 
changes (2006–2007), but the growth is much more muted than in the 
period spanning bankruptcy reform. For example, between Q1 2006 
and Q1 2007, the mean maximum FICO score decreased one point; 
noticeably less than the fi ve-point decrease after BAPCPA. Similarly, 
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SOURCE: U.S. ABS Issuance and Outstanding, Securities Industry and Financial Mar-
kets Association (see Note 108).
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loan volumes increased 128 percent between Q1 2007 and Q1 2006, but 
this is not the astounding 309 percent increase we observe between Q1 
2005 and Q1 2006. Continuing the puzzling trend, margins increased 
50 basis points between the fi rst quarter of 2006 and the fi rst quarter of 
2007. 
If securitization were a principal driver of the expansion of credit 
we observe between before and after bankruptcy reform, we would 
expect similar effects in the cost and availability of credit between 
the bankruptcy reform period (2005–2006) as well as the period after 
(2006–2007). That is not what the data show: the changes in borrower 
composition and the spike in loan volumes are quite pronounced in the 
period around bankruptcy reform, while not nearly as much in the same 
period one year later. 
Figure 7.7 depicts securitizations outstanding, which are necessarily 
cumulative. Figure 7.8 presents annual PSLABS issuances, which is a 
closer analogue to loan originations—closer but with one caveat. When 
comparing securitization issuances and loan originations, it is important 
to consider that PSLABS issuances necessarily lag originations. This 
is because it takes some time to package and securitize loans that are 
made during a particular time period. In addition, the typical securitiza-
tion trust contains loans originated during multiple years as part of the 
risk spreading investors require. The “youngest” loans included in a 
portfolio of PSLABS were typically originated 3–6 months prior to the 
issuance of the securities.111 Because of this lag, if the secondary mar-
ket was the reason for the large expansion of credit we observe in the 
time period around bankruptcy reform (and not BAPCPA), we should 
observe an increase in securitizations in 2005 (or before) relative to 
later years. The expected increase should attenuate in 2006 and later 
Table 7.4  Raw Means of Outcomes of Interest in the First Quarters of 







Maximum FICO score 720 715 714
Margin (%) 4.2 4.6 5.1
Original balance ($) 8,614 10,015 10,147
Loans originated 4,960 15,318 19,658
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to account for the “cooling off” in credit expansion that we discussed 
above. We observe the opposite. As shown in Figure 7.8, securitization 
issuances spike in 2006, the year immediately after BAPCPA became 
effective. 
Because of the lag in issuing securities, PSLABS packaged and 
offered to investors in 2006 were primarily made up of loans origi-
nated before bankruptcy reform. Regardless of when these loans were 
originated, however, when BAPCPA became effective on October 17, 
2005, all private student loans became presumptively nondischargeable 
and thus more valuable to investors. It is thus not surprising to observe 
a spike in securitization issuances in 2006 as shown in Figure 7.8 and 
a corresponding faster increase in PSLABS outstanding between 2005 
and 2006, as shown in Figure 7.7. The expected recovery of PSLs was 
higher now that they (effectively) could not be discharged in bank-
Figure 7.8  Issuances of Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities 


















SOURCE: CFPB PSL report (see Note 112).
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ruptcy. This likely increased the demand for PSL securities from the 
secondary market but only after BAPCPA was enacted.113 This latter 
increased demand, however, could not be the cause of what we observe 
during the 2005–2006 period.
Demand for PSLABS was progressively increasing well before 
BAPCPA was enacted. It is likely responsible for expansion of the PSL 
market.114 However, a steady expansion of PSLABS from 2003–2007 
and a spike in PSLABS issuances in 2006 (which necessarily included 
few loans originated post-BAPCPA) are inconsistent with a hypothesis 
that the sudden expansion of credit we observe between Q1 2005 and 
Q1 2006 (around bankruptcy reform) was caused by securitization. 
Instead, what we know about securitization volumes in the period dur-
ing this time is more consistent with a story that bankruptcy reform 
further stoked the fi res of the secondary market, leading to the peak in 
PSLABS issuances in 2006. 
If securitization does not explain the expansion of credit we observe, 
then what accounts for the puzzling increase in margins? One plausible 
explanation is that the increased prices are driven by lender advertising. 
We’ve reported evidence that the composition of borrowers changed 
after BAPCPA: in other words, credit expanded to borrowers who 
would not have received loans before the law changed. The data also 
show that borrowers who would have received loans before BAPCPA 
obtained loans in increasing numbers after the law change. 
There is reason to think that advertising might have been well tar-
geted to the relevant population. Advertisements for PSLs could have 
come through regular channels (such as television, direct mail, and 
the Internet). Lenders could have also targeted students directly. Dur-
ing this period, the lenders in our study were part of FFELP and were 
federal as well as private student loans. If a student had applied for a 
FFELP loan from a lender, they would have some information about 
both the appetite and credit profi le of the student, not to mention their 
contact information. Armed with this knowledge, the lender could reach 
out directly to students and promote their PSL product. This focused 
advertisement would lead to increased student demand for PSLs, which 
would have driven up the cost of the loans. There is anecdotal evidence 
of a growth in direct-to-consumer marketing during this time period 
and continuing for a few years. 
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We need much more information than we have available to test this 
theory. Ideally, we would have some data on advertising trends over 
time. We would also really want to have data on how margins were 
changing before 2005. It seems plausible that lenders began trying to 
fan demand as a result of securitization before BAPCPA. In that case, 
BAPCPA may have further increased marketing efforts. The increase in 
margins that we observe may be part of a broader trend that continues in 
the period one year after bankruptcy reform; potentially a lagging result 
of the increase in advertisement the previous year. Regrettably, the data 
available do not allow us to corroborate these suppositions. 
As a fi nal note, we briefl y discuss the potential welfare effects of 
bankruptcy reform vis-à-vis PSLs. Our data do not allow us to draw con-
clusions about whether the expansion of credit was welfare-enhancing. 
Robert Lawless and others have noted that a rapid expansion of credit 
is usually correlated with increased bankruptcy fi lings.115 Comparing 
PSLs to loans issued by nonprofi t institutions, the CFPB found that 
“more careful underwriting ([by nonprofi ts] relative to [PSL] lenders) 
reduced default rates.”116 It is worth remembering, however, that in 
terms of less-than-prime borrowers, the credit expansion we observe 
was modest: the effect on the average credit score was the same as 
applying for multiple credit cards within a short period. 
Arguably, however, an expansion of credit is precisely what sup-
porters of the special treatment for PSLs intended. As then Representa-
tive Lindsey Graham (R-SC) stated during the 1999 debates arguing for 
the passage of the law:
There is a growing industry in the private sector. There is a $1.25 
billion loan volume for where private lenders who will loan money 
to students for their college expenses as the federally guaranteed 
program does not in every occasion meet the needs of the student, 
and we are trying to give the private lender the same protection 
under bankruptcy that the federally guaranteed loan program has 
and nonprofi t organizations have. We are trying to make sure 
they are [sic] available loans, loans are available to students to 
meet their fi nancial needs, and this would have a benefi cial effect, 
make sure that the loan volume necessary to take care of college 
expenses are available for students . . . 117
The congressional record is bare of any other explanations for the 
purpose of the special treatment of PSLs. John Pottow has theorized 
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that nondischargeability can be justifi ed “as an attempt to make private 
loans ‘cheaper’ for students” and to create a “a robust private lending 
market . . . a bountiful capital supply available for loans.”118
A bountiful capital supply was indeed available for loans immedi-
ately after BAPCPA, although the capital supply disappeared almost as 
quickly as it had appeared. After growing 20 percent per year between 
2005 and 2007, PSL originations in our sample peaked at $10.1 bil-
lion and dropped to pre-2005 levels in 2010–2011.119 Of course, other 
intervening factors likely played a role here, the Great Recession and 
credit crunch in particular. Nonetheless, it is important to note that a 
law’s purported positive effects (increasing availability of credit) may 
be short lived, while its potential negative ones (nondischargeability in 
bankruptcy) continue on. 
The increase in the risk premium lenders charge for a loan, on the 
other hand, does not seem welfare enhancing to borrowers. A 35-basis-
point increase in the price of a $10,000 15-year loan can translate to an 
added cost to the borrower of almost $25 per year or $365 over the life 
of the loan.120 This increase becomes more signifi cant when one consid-
ers that the lenders in the sample made an additional 10,358 loans in the 
postperiod. If we take our $25 per year increase as an average for all 
loans, this would mean that BAPCPA may have cost student borrowers 
an additional $382,950 per year in the fi rst quarter of 2006.121
CONCLUSION
The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were a watershed 
moment almost a decade in the making. Proponents of bankruptcy 
reform blamed rapidly rising bankruptcy fi lings on strategic consum-
ers using the Bankruptcy Code to escape their debts. They argued 
that reform was necessary to prevent strategic borrower behavior and 
reduce the cost of consumer credit. Opponents of the proposed bank-
ruptcy reforms pointed to the dearth of data supporting the strategic 
consumer story and instead cited behavioral experiments establishing 
consumers’ less-than-perfect rationality and empirical evidence that 
the majority of bankruptcy fi lers had very low income and few assets. 
Opponents predicted that there would be no discernible change in the 
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cost of consumer credit or loan volumes. In this chapter, we developed 
and tested theoretical models predicting the effects of the part of the law 
change on PSLs granted to students at four-year undergraduate institu-
tions.122 Using a unique data set of PSL originations before and after the 
law change, we tested those predictions using OLS regression, Blinder-
Oaxaca, matching, and DD methods. 
Some of our fi ndings are unsurprising: the law change caused a 
moderate expansion of credit for less creditworthy borrowers, although 
the average borrower credit score decreased only slightly in practi-
cal terms. Loan volumes also tripled; we attribute 60 percent of that 
increase to the law change. Contrary to our hypotheses, however, we 
fi nd that the overall cost of private student loans at four-year under-
graduate institutions increased by an average of 35 basis points as a 
result of the law change. We posit that the larger cost may have been 
driven by increased demand for PSLs from students as a result of lender 
advertising. We speculate that the increased marketing may have started 
before BAPCPA.
Our analysis so far suggests that this is a story about distributions—
that is, that certain students may have seen an increase in the cost of 
their loans and others might have seen a decrease. In future work, we 
intend to investigate the variation in credit quality and margins to see 
whether the effect of BAPCPA was different across types of schools 
(e.g., higher versus lower prestige); types of borrowers (e.g., prime ver-
sus subprime); or types of loans (e.g., those marketed through the school 
versus those marketed directly to the consumer).123 We expect that this 
will give us a more complete picture of the effects of BAPCPA.124 
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private and federal loans—that were fi led between 2002 and 2006 in the Western 
District of Washington. Rafael I. Pardo and Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student 
Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 179, 
200 (2009) [hereinafter Pardo & Lacey (2009)].
 37.  See Iuliano, supra note 31, 509 (mean age 49 and median 48.5); Pardo & Lacey 
(2005), supra note 6, at 442-43 (mean 41.5, median 41); Pardo & Lacey (2009), 
supra note 36, at 204 (mean: 45; median not reported).
 38.  Iuliano, supra note 31, at 508 (68 percent unmarried, 46 percent had dependents); 
Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6, at 445-47 (62 percent unmarried, 56 percent 
had dependents); Pardo & Lacey (2009), supra note 36, at 204 (80 percent unmar-
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www.fi naid.org/educators/20070814pslFICOdistribution.pdf.
 50.  Id. at 2.
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between 2002 and 2007. Krantowitz, supra note 49 at 1. One issue with Kran-
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 52.  Id. at 4.
 53.  Id. 
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disclose any change in underwriting criteria for loans originated after BAPCPA. 
Id.
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do not have to be parallel.
 64.  Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981).
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Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1255 (2002).The rise of the 
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student loans or they may suffer from a number of other behavioral biases other 
than present bias, such as optimism bias or probability neglect. Cass Sunstein, 
Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L. J. 61 (2002).
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 76.  Id.
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 78.  “Title IV” refers to the part of the Higher Education Act of 1965 that covers 
the administration of federal fi nancial aid programs. Title IV Program Volume 
Reports | Federal Student Aid, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/about/
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be impossible to disentangle them. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. 
Dear Colleague Letter (Apr. 27, 2006),  http://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/attachments/
GEN0605.pdf (accessed June 6, 2014).
 80.  ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 2.
 81.  Editorial, Banks Win, You Lose, Wilmington Star-News, Mar. 10, 2005, at 8A. But 
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BANKER, Apr. 1, 2005.
 82.  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), 
Pub.L. 109–8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
 83.  To the extent that lenders made changes to their underwriting criteria in anticipa-
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smaller than the true effect.
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net of their cost of funding, which is more closely described by the margin over 
the index, since the index is likely chosen to correspond to the index of the source 
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 85.  Discussions with industry participants suggest that private student loans over the 
2005–2011 period were underwritten based on the highest credit score among bor-
rowers and coborrowers.
 86.  The constant is subsumed in Xi.
 87.  See Alan S. Blinder, Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Esti-
mates, 8 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 436 (1973); Ronald Oaxaca, Wage Differentials in 
Urban Labor Markets, 14 INT’L ECON. REV. 693 (1973).
 88.  This group is an analogue to the minority group in the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition.
 89.  Ronald Oaxaca & Michael Ransom, Identifi cation in Detailed Wage Decomposi-
tions, 81 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 154 (1999).
 90.  Paul Rosenbaum & Daniel Rubin, The Central Role of the Propensity Score in 
Observational Studies for Causal Effects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41 (1983).
 91.  Id.
 92.  Support is defi ned in the statistical sense; the common support is the set of covari-
ate values that are in the distribution of covariate variables of both the treated and 
control group. 
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 93.  See Trends in Student Aid, 2013. College Board. http://trends.collegeboard.org/
sites/default/fi les/student-aid-2013-full-report.pdf (accessed June 3, 2014).
 94.  See Title IV Program Volume Reports: Federal Student Aid, FED. STUDENT AID, 
http://studentaid.ed.gov/about/data-center/student/title-iv (accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
 95.  For example, during the sample period the annual Stafford Loan limits were 
$2,625 for dependent freshmen, $3,500 for dependent sophomores, and $5,500 
for upperclassmen. PLUS Loans were limited to cost of attendance minus the 
expected family contribution. Borrowers qualify for subsidized Stafford Loans 
based on fi nancial need.
 96.  See Appendix 7A for additional detail.
 97.  See generally Steve Pischke, Lecture Notes on Measurement Error (Spring 
2007), http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/spischke/ec524/Merr_new.pdf (accessed July 
27, 2014).
 98.  School fi xed effect is simply a dummy variable for each school. Sample sizes 
may increase between specifi cations 2 and 3 because the school fi xed effect is 
from the lender data sample, whereas the school type is from the merge with the 
PEPs data, and tuition and fees are imputed from the merge with IPEDS.
 99.  This is obtained from subtracting 100 percent from the 274.3 percent marginal 
effect. 
100.  As above, we attribute the change to a change in underwriting standards for 
a given type of students, to the effect due to coeffi cients in a Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition.
101. This corresponds to a coeffi cient on postperiod of 1.233. A back-of-the-envelope 
calculation yields that 92 percent of the threefold increase in PSL origination 
volume in the fi rst quarter of 2006 can be explained by the law change.
102.  It is also important to note that we do not observe changes in school aid.
103. Parent PLUS loans in this period were fi xed at 4.17 percent in the 2004–2005 aca-
demic year and 6.10 percent in the 2005–2006 academic year for credit-worthy 
parents, whereas PSLs offered were typically variable rate loans and had initial 
rates of as much as 19 percent for the riskiest borrowers. See Interest Rates on 
the Federal PLUS Loan, PARENTPLUSLOAN.COM, http://www.parentplusloan.com/
plus-loans/plus-loan-interest-rate.php (accessed June 9, 2014).
104.  At the same time, PSL asset-backed securities (PSLABS) also increase two-fold, 
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2006. CFPB PLS REPORT, supra note 34, at 18.
105. H0 predicted that none of the outcomes of interest would change, but we found 
that they all did. 
106. Non-GSA Mortgage-related ABS issuances peaked in 2003 at over $3.2 billion. 
That peak was followed by a drop to $2.3 billion in 2004 and slight recovery to 
$2.7 billion in 2005. US Mortgage-Related Securities Issuance and Outstanding 
(xls), SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION (SIFMA) (June 3, 
2014),  http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (accessed June 11, 2014). 
GSA backed securities also peaked in 2003 at 2.8 billion. US Agency Mortgage 
Securities Issuance and Outstanding (xls), SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS ASSOCIATION (SIFMA) (June 3, 2014),  http://www.sifma.org/research/
statistics.aspx (accessed June 11, 2014).
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supra note 11, at 64.
108. US ABS Issuance and Outstanding (xls), SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS ASSOCIATION (SIFMA) (June 3, 2014),  http://www.sifma.org/research/
statistics.aspx (accessed June 11, 2014). 
109. We are not aware of any signifi cant legal changes between Q1 2006 and Q1 2007 
that would affect our sample. In particular, federal loan interest rates and amount 
caps remained the same during this time period.
110. Ideally, we’d also like to look at the period before 2005, but unfortunately, we do 
not have that data.
111.  See, e.g., SLC Student Loan Trust 2005-3 at S-19, The Student Loan Corpora-
tion (Dec. 1, 2005), available at https://www.navient.com/assets/about/investors/
debtasset/SLC-Loan-Trusts/2005-3/20054.pdf (6 months) (accessed June 11, 
2014); SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-14 at S-43, Sallie Mae Servicing (Nov. 6, 
2003), available at https://www.navient.com/assets/about/investors/debtasset/
SLM-Loan-Trusts/01-05/2003-14/200314.pdf (3 months) (accessed June 11, 
2014).
112. CFPB PSL Report, supra note 11, at 18. Unfortunately, we do not have data 
before 2004.
113.  See Andrea Murad and Jeffrey Prackup, Private Student Loan ABS Tutorial, 
FITCH RATINGS 2 (“The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005 codifi es this treatment by broadly defi ning an education loan under 
the bankruptcy code to include all education loans made to borrowers or to par-
ents of borrowers attending Title IV eligible institutions. This treatment aids lend-
ers in collecting on private loans and results in higher recoveries relative to other 
unsecured consumer loans.”), available at http://www.ihep.org/assets/fi les/gcfp-
fi les/Private_Student_Loan_ABS_Tutorial.pdf (accessed June 12, 2014). 
114. We cannot isolate all possible causal factors and run our analyses in a vacuum, 
but to the extent policymakers cannot pass laws in a vacuum either, it is valuable 
to understand the effect of the law.
115. See Bob Lawless, One More Time, with Feelings, CREDITSLIPS (Aug. 22, 2011), 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/08/one-more-time-with-feeling.html; 
Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 3.
 116. CFPB PSL REPORT, supra note 11, at 30. The CFPB also found that default rate 
for nonprofi t institution loans were “approximately half of their for-profi t market 
counterparts.” Id.
117.  145 Cong. Rec., supra note 2. (statement of Rep. Graham).
118. In other words,
  [i]f an otherwise dischargeable unsecured debt is rendered nondischarge-
able by the law, then the bankruptcy-state scenario regarding that debt 
becomes worse for the debtor (it does not go away) and better for the 
lender (it does not go away).  In a world of competitive, zero-profi t lend-
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ing markets, this increased payoff for the lender must be translated ex ante 
into an improved cost of capital for the borrower. 
  Furthermore, we might also expect, in “a robust private lending market . . . 
[to fi nd] a bountiful capital supply available for loans.” John A. E. Pottow, 
The Nondischargeability of Student Loans in Personal Bankruptcy Pro-
ceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. BUS. L. J. 245, 262 (2006).
119. CFPB PSL REPORT, supra note 11, at 17.
120.  Assuming the loan would have been at 8 percent but instead was at 8.3 percent.
121. This calculation is incredibly simplifi ed, but it was computed by multiplying the 
$25/year additional cost by the number of PSLs originated in Q1 2006 (15,318).
122. We consider the Block-Lieb hypothesis to be a distinct model even though it can 
be described as a subset of the CP model.
 123. We intend to apply techniques that take the distribution of borrower character-
istics into account, including quantile regression, the DiNardo, Fortin, Lemieux 
decomposition. John DiNardo, et al., Labor Market Institutions and the Distribu-
tion of Wages, 1973–1992: A Semiparametric Approach, 64 ECONOMETRICA 1001 
(1996). 
124. There is another avenue of further research. This chapter focuses on undergradu-
ates at four-year institutions. Given the diversity of educational options available, 
such as two-year schools, certifi cate programs, and postgraduate education of 
various kinds, another extension of this work would be to consider the effects of 
BAPCPA on loans in these other educational markets.
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Appendix 7A
Tables
Table 7A.1  Loan-Level OLS Analysis, Q1 2005 and Q1 2006
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Maximum FICO score
Post −5.825*** −5.890*** −5.262***
(0.0811) (0.0752) (0.679)
N 19,759 19,759 20,170
R2 0.013 0.083 0.192
Margin
Post 0.0046*** 0.0046*** 0.0042*** 0.0036*** 0.0033***
(4.5e-05) (4.5e-05) (0.00022) (0.00022) (0.00022)
N 19,759 19,759 20,170 20,170 20,170
R2 0.042 0.042 0.200 0.327 0.389
Original balance
Post 1,326*** 1,325*** 1,268*** 1,198*** 1,189***
(16.68) (16.88) (104.7) (104.1) (103.6)
N 19,759 19,759 20,170 20,170 20,170
R2 0.0159 0.0161 0.181 0.186 0.187
Controls
Tuition and fees X X
Year in school X X X X X
School type X X
Has a coborrower X X X
Maximum FICO score X
Spline of maximum 
FICO score
X
School fi xed effects X X X
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Each cell 
corresponds to a separate regression. Restricted to four-year undergraduates in the fi rst 
quarters of 2005 and 2006. Spline of FICO scores in 20-point intervals.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, and 
PEPS.
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Table 7A.2  Loan-Level Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions, Q1 2005 and 
Q1 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
                                 Panel A: Max FICO
Before BAPCPA 720.4*** 720.4*** 720.3***
(0.654) (0.654) (0.706)
After BAPCPA 715.0*** 715.0*** 715.0***
(0.388) (0.388) (0.402)
Difference 5.439*** 5.439*** 5.377***
(0.761) (0.761) (0.812)
Endowments −0.329*** −0.398* −0.939
(0.0941) (0.219) (1.200)
Coeffi cients 5.967*** 6.018*** 1.058
(0.761) (0.726) (4.741)
Interactions −0.199* −0.181 5.257
(0.113) (0.117) (4.840)
                               Panel B: Original balance
Before BAPCPA 11,171*** 11,171*** 11,221 11,221 11,221***
(42.67) (42.67) (0) (0) (42.15)
After BAPCPA 11,183*** 11,183*** 11,288 11,288 11,288***
(37.65) (37.65) (0) (0) (37.05)
Difference −12.11 −12.11 −66.82 −66.82 −66.82
(56.90) (56.91) (0) (0) (56.12)
Endowments −18.66* −13.41 −399.4 −255.1 −116.2***
(10.53) (10.85) (0) (0) (10.06)
Coeffi cients −7.194 −11.60 112.4 174.2 32.94
(56.12) (56.07) (0) (0) (56.32)
Interactions 13.75*** 12.91*** 220.2 14.03 16.39
(4.836) (4.902) (0) (0) (11.01)
                                Panel C: Margins
Before BAPCPA 0.0436*** 0.0436*** 0.0436 0.0436 0.0436***
(6.40e−05) (6.40e−05) (0) (0) (6.32e−05)
After BAPCPA 0.0469*** 0.0469*** 0.0470 0.0470 0.0470***
(5.31e−05) (5.31e−05) (0) (0) (5.26e−05)
Difference −0.00335***−0.00335*** −0.00347 −0.00347 −0.00347***
(8.31e−05) (8.31e−05) (0) (0) (8.22e−05)
Endowments −8.05e−06 −1.41e−05 −0.000660 −0.00127 −0.00110***
(1.12e−05) (1.16e−05) (0) (0) (4.47e−05)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
                                Panel C: Margins (continued)
Coeffi cients −0.00336***−0.00336*** −0.00289 −0.00247 −0.00256***
(8.24e−05) (8.24e−05) (0) (0) (7.32e−05)
Interactions 2.49e−05***2.48e−05*** 8.36e−05 0.000276 0.000194***
(7.18e−06) (7.28e−06) (0) (0) (1.96e−05)
Controls
Tuition and fees x x
Year in school x x x x x
School type x x




Spline of maximum 
FICO score
x
School fi xed effects x x x
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Restricted to four-year 
undergraduates in the fi rst quarters of 2005 and 2006. Spline of FICO scores in 20-year intervals. 
Tuition and fees calculated based on IPEDS data and student’s reported state of residence.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, and 
PEPS.
Table 7A.2  (continued)
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Table 7A.3  Loan-Level Propensity Score Matching, Q1 2005 and Q1 2006
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
                               Panel A: Maximum FICO score






                               Panel B: Margin
Unmatched 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Average treatment 
on the treated
0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
                                Panel C: Original balance
Unmatched 1371.186 1371.1853 1352.15 1352.147 1352.147
(125.50)*** (125.50)*** (127.05)*** (127.05)*** (127.05)***
Average treatment 
on the treated
1272.251 1120.066 1425.717 1303.748 1157.226
(240.41)*** (213.86)*** (214.30)*** (168.91)*** (170.74)***
Number of observations
Untreated 4,828 4,828 4,838 4,838 4,838
Treated 14,931 14,931 13,634 13,634 13,634
Controls
Tuition and fees x x
Year in school x x x x x
School type x x




Spline of maximum 
FICO score
x
School fi xed 
effects
x x x
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Restricted to four-
year undergraduates in the fi rst quarters of 2005 and 2006. Spline of FICO scores in 20-point 
intervals. Propensity scores calculated using probit regression. Nearest neighbor matching with 
replacement. Tuition and fees calculated based on IPEDS data and student’s reported state of 
residence.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, and 
PEPS.
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Table 7A.4  Private Student Loan Volumes at the School Level, Q1 2005  
 and Q1 2006
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
           Panel A: OLS
Post 0.546*** 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.820*** 1.008*** 1.009***
(0.169) (0.174) (0.174) (0.108) (0.0829) (0.0811)
1.726 1.603 1.603 2.270 2.740 2.743
            Panel B: Oaxaca decomposition
Difference 0.541*** 0.436** 0.590*** 0.744*** 0.590*** 0.590***
(0.178) (0.182) (0.165) (0.222) (0.183) (0.180)
1.718 1.547 1.804 2.104 1.804 1.804
Difference due to 
endowments
–0.00419 0.00179 –0.135 −0.0761 −0.292** −0.289**
(0.0484) (0.0489) (0.113) (0.180) (0.138) (0.136)
0.996 1.002 0.835 0.927 0.747 0.749
Difference due to 
coeffi cients
0.546*** 0.492*** 0.873*** 0.974*** 1.069*** 1.072***
(0.170) (0.184) (0.103) (0.154) (0.0777) (0.0748)
1.726 1.636 2.394 2.649 2.912 2.921
Difference due to 
interactions
0.000748 –0.0581 –0.148* −0.153 −0.187** −0.193**
(0.00896) (0.0857) (0.0825) (0.144) (0.0757) (0.0769)
0.999 0.944 0.862 0.858 0.829 0.824
            Panel C: Propensity score matching
Average treatment 
on the treated
0.993*** 1.016*** 1.146*** 1.141*** 1.148*** 1.148***
(0.0408) (0.0412) (0.0413) (0.0410) (0.0412) (0.0413)
2.699 2.762 3.146 3.130 3.152 3.152
Controls
Tuition and fees x x x x x x
Graduation rate x x x x x
Carnegie 
classifi cation 





% black, % Hispanic x
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects in 
italics. Restricted to four-year undergraduates in the fi rst quarters of 2005 and 2006. Marginal 
effects calculated by exponentiating estimated coeffi cients. Outcome is natural log of PSL bor-
rowers in the lender data.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, PEPS, and Title 
IV Program Volume Reports.
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Table 7A.5  Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effects of 
BAPCPA on Loan Volumes and Original Balances, Q1 
2005 and Q1 2006
 Control group









PLUS Loans All federal 
loans
Loan volumes
ln(originations) 0.512*** 0.459*** 0.491*** 0.450*** 0.487***
(0.0210) (0.0215) (0.0210) (0.0231) (0.0207)
1.669 1.582 1.634 1.568 1.627
ln(borrowers) 0.491*** 0.438*** 0.471*** 0.434*** 0.467***
(0.0208) (0.0214) (0.0209) (0.0231) (0.0206)
1.634 1.550 1.602 1.543 1.595
Average loan size 
Original balance 641.6*** 647.5*** 624.5*** −120.7* 542.9***
(163.5) (159.9) (161.2) (68.55) (143.1)
ln(original balance) 0.0544*** 0.0451*** 0.0450*** -0.0143* 0.0330***
(0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0148) (0.00843) (0.0117)
1.056 1.570 1.046 0.986 1.034
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal 
effects in italics. Restricted to four-year undergraduates in the fi rst quarters of 2005 
and 2006. Marginal effects calculated by exponentiated estimated coeffi cients. Note 
that program effects on loan size may be biased downward.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, PEPS, and Title 
IV Program Volume Reports.
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Appendix 7B
Bias in Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Suppose that the outcome equation for federal loans is determined by the 
following equation and that yi
* is bounded above by ymax
yi
* = f(xi ) + εi
Then the observed mean fi rst difference, , can be written as 
a function of the uncensored loan amount, bi
* function, and the maximum loan 
amount allowable. 
So when we take difference-in-differences when the outcome for private 
loans is not censored (i.e., bi = bi
*), the estimate δ̂  of program effect δ is biased 
downwards. 
We do not observe , so we cannot estimate the magnitude of the 
bias.
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Appendix 7C
Stiglitz-Weiss Analysis
This appendix contains the relevant theorems, notation, and equations 
from Stiglitz and Weiss’s 1981 paper. For ease of discussion, we retain Stiglitz 
and Weiss’s numbering.
Each project, indexed by θ, is assumed to have a probability distribution 
of gross return R. The distribution of returns is denoted F(R,θ) and the density 
of returns is denoted f(R,θ). Higher values of θ correspond to higher levels of 
risk in the sense of mean-preserving spreads, i.e., for θ1 > θ2
then for y ≥ 0, 
An individual who borrows amount B at interest rate r̂ repays his loan if 
R > B(1 + r̂ ). Note that this is a simplifi cation from the Stiglitz-Weiss model as 
there is no term for collateral, since student loans are unsecured. The return to 
the creditor or bank is denoted ρ(R, r̂ ) = min (R,B(1 + r̂ )). Upper bars denote 
means.
Theorem 1: For a given interest rate r̂, there is a critical value θ̂  such that a fi rm 
borrows from the bank if and only if θ > θ̂ .
Theorem 3: The expected return on a loan to a bank is a decreasing function 
of the riskiness of the loan to the bank.
Theorem 5: Whenever ρ(r̂ ) has an interior mode, there exists supply functions 
of funds such that competitive equilibrium entails credit rationing.
Corollary 1: As the supply of funds increases, the excess demand for funds 
decreases, but the interest rate charged remains unchanged, so long as there is 
any credit rationing.
Equation (7.5): (Zero-profi t condition)
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Private student loan borrowers are analogous to the fi rms in the model: 
projects, or school-major choices, with different mean returns can be distin-
guished from each other—to the lender returns to education for individuals 
in the same major at the same school are drawn from the same distribution.1 
Private student loan borrowers with the same expected mean return differ from 
each other in their risk parameter, which Stiglitz-Weiss denote θ, where risk is 
increasing in θ. In the analysis below, we consider credit score a proxy for −θ, 
since risk is decreasing in credit score. The BAPCPA reforms that effectively 
made most loans nondischargeable in bankruptcy decrease the risk associated 
with any given loan, which effectively increases the expected return to the 
creditor, as described in Stiglitz and Weiss’s Theorem 3.2 
Given the Stiglitz-Weiss model and the theories described in the paper, our 
hypotheses for the effect of the change to the bankruptcy laws making private 
student loans presumptively nondischargeable can be stated as follows:
• H1—Loan pricing (that is, lender margins) should remain the same 
for originations after the law change. Since the profi tability of a given 
loan increases for creditors, following Theorem 3 the supply of credit 
should increase.3 Assuming an interior mode for the return to the cred-
itor of lending at a given interest rate, Theorem 5 implies that credit 
rationing will still exist. Given these conditions, Corollary 1 states 
that “as the supply of funds increases, the excess demand for funds 
decreases, but the interest rate charged remains unchanged, so long as 
there is credit rationing.”4
• H2—Lenders should be willing to lend to borrowers with lower credit 
quality than they were willing to lend before the law change. This is 
essentially a decrease in the critical value θ̂ , which Theorem 1 states 
that an individual will borrow from the creditor if and only if the bor-
rower’s value of θ exceeds θ̂ .5
• H3—Overall loan volumes should increase. This follows from the 
argument presented for H1.
Appendix Notes
 1.  One can think of a choice of major at a particular school as an investment with 
uncertain returns. For example, a freshman liberal arts student might know the 
distribution of returns of liberal arts majors from his school but does not know 
what his particular return will be ex ante.
 2.  See Stiglitz and Weiss supra note 64.
 3.  Theorems refer to theorems in Stiglitz and Weiss’s paper.
 4.  Id. at 398.
 5.  Consider Stiglitz and Weiss’s Equation (5). Id.
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